Handbook of Financial Cryptography and Security (Chapman & Hall/CRC Cryptography and Network Security Series)

Handbook of Financial Cryptography and Security (Chapman & Hall/CRC Cryptography and Network Security Series)

Language: English

Pages: 631

ISBN: 1420059815

Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub


The Handbook of Financial Cryptography and Security elucidates the theory and techniques of cryptography and illustrates how to establish and maintain security under the framework of financial cryptography. It applies various cryptographic techniques to auctions, electronic voting, micropayment systems, digital rights, financial portfolios, routing networks, and more.

In the first part, the book examines blind signatures and other important cryptographic techniques with respect to digital cash/e-cash. It also looks at the role of cryptography in auctions and voting, describes properties that can be required of systems implementing value exchange, and presents methods by which selected receivers can decrypt signals sent out to everyone.

The second section begins with a discussion on lowering transaction costs of settling payments so that commerce can occur at the sub-penny level. The book then addresses the challenge of a system solution for the protection of intellectual property, before presenting an application of cryptography to financial exchanges and markets.

Exploring financial cryptography in the real world, the third part discusses the often-complex issues of phishing, privacy and anonymity, and protecting the identity of objects and users.

With a focus on human factors, the final section considers whether systems will elicit or encourage the desired behavior of the participants of the system. It also explains how the law and regulations impact financial cryptography.

In the real world, smart and adaptive adversaries employ all types of means to circumvent inconvenient security restraints. This useful handbook provides answers to general questions about the field of financial cryptography as well as solutions to specific real-world security problems.

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Luxembourg Luxembourg R´ obert P´ arhonyi Inter Access B.V. Hilversum, The Netherlands Serdar Pehlivanoglu Division of Mathematical Sciences Nanyang Technological University Singapore vii ✐ ✐ ✐ ✐ ✐ ✐ “main” — 2010/6/29 — 17:06 — page viii — #5 ✐ ✐ viii Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi Department of Electrical Engineering and Information Sciences Ruhr-University Bochum Bochum, Germany Reihaneh Safavi-Naini Department of Computer Science University of Calgary Calgary, Canada Nicholas Paul Sheppard

if the serial number (S1 , S2 ) is fresh. If it is, the bank accepts. The bank stores (S1 , S2 , C, rα , rβ , rγ ) in its database of spent e-coins. (old) (old) (old) If the bank finds that (S1 , S2 , C (old) , rα , rβ , rγ ) exists already in its database, it knows that somebody double-spent. The bank checks whether the challenge C is fresh: and if it finds that C (old) = C it rejects the e-coin because it is the merchant’s responsibility to choose a fresh challenge. If the challenge is

protocols considered in this chapter depends on two parameters: the number of bidders n and the number of possible prices or bids k. Since prices can be encoded in binary, one would hope for a logarithmic dependence on k. However, as it turns out, representing bids in unary (resulting in a linear dependence on k) sometimes allows to reduce other important complexity measures such as the number of rounds. In the next section, we will discuss the possibility of unconditionally fully private auction

the hash chain root can be as short as 128 bits. That implies SKi is usually beyond the human’s capability to memorize while r might be memorized. Consequently, the signer A could protect r in a way different from SKi . A might remember r and manually input r at the time of refreshing CertA . After the hash value needed for refreshing is generated, r will be erased from the local computer system thus minimizing the possibility of compromise caused by system break-in. ✐ ✐ ✐ ✐ ✐ ✐ “main” —

. . . . 18.4 Information and the Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18.5 Legal Obligation to Keep Personal Information Secure . . . . 18.5.1 Data Protection Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18.5.2 Consumer Protection or Trade Practices Regulation . 18.5.3 Legislation Requiring Security of Personal Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 497 498 500 504 506 513 514 521 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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