The Philosophy of Existentialism: Selected Essays

The Philosophy of Existentialism: Selected Essays

Language: English

Pages: 448

ISBN: 1480444561

Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub

A collection of essays by Jean-Paul Sartre that touch upon the subject of existentialism by looking at aesthetics, emotions, writing, phenomenology, and perception
The Philosophy of Existentialism collects representative essays on Jean-Paul Sartre’s pioneering subject: existentialism. Beginning with a thoughtful introduction by fellow French philosopher Jean Wahl, this worklooks at existentialism through several lenses, exploring topics such as the emotions, imagination, nothingness, freedom, responsibility, and the desire to be God.
By providing exposition on a variety of subjects, The Philosophy of Existentialism is a valuable introduction to Sartre’s ideas.

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nevertheless forced to affirm at least that it is. Thus, let anyone deny being whatever he wishes, he can not cause it not to be, thanks to the very fact that he denies that it is this or that. Negation can not touch the nucleus of being of Being, which is absolute plenitude and entire positivity. By contrast Non-being is a negation which aims at this nucleus of absolute density. Non-being is denied at the heart of Being. When Hegel writes, “(Being and nothingness) are empty abstractions, and the

prohibitions, regret, etc. For “Dasein” there is even a permanent possibility of finding oneself “face to face” with nothingness and discovering it as a phenomenon: this possibility is anguish. Heidegger, while establishing the possibilities of a concrete apprehension of Nothingness, never falls into the error which Hegel made; he does not preserve a being for Non-Being, not even an abstract being. Nothing is not; it nihilates itself.11 It is supported and conditioned by transcendence. We know

others that he is man and his nature as a man will not be revealed to him in a particular way by the pretext that he is himself what he studies. Like “objective” experimentation, introspection will furnish only facts. If it is necessary that there be later a rigorous concept of man—and even that is doubtful—this concept can be envisaged only as the crown of a finished science, that is, one which is done with forever. It would be still only a unifying hypothesis, invented to co-ordinate and grade

that consciousness does not thetically have consciousness of itself as degrading itself in order to escape the pressure of the world; it has only positional consciousness of the degradation of the world which takes place on the magical level. So it is non-thetically conscious of itself. It is to this extent and this extent only that one can say of an emotion that it is not sincere. There is therefore nothing surprising in the fact that the finality of the emotion is not placed by an act of

properly so called, and it presents in the form of a spatial object the results of this effort. Nevertheless, it would have been interesting to know whether all the acts, beginning with a certain degree of difficulty, are translated into a scheme, or whether there can occur intellections (understanding, perception) without images. The results of Mesmer’s experiments enable us to complete the work of Flach on this point; there are many cases in which understanding occurs without imagery, by simply

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